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Résumé de l'article
La crise de Suez est généralement considérée comme un tournant décisif dans les
relations entre le Canada et la Grande-Bretagne. Le premier ministre Louis
St-Laurent et le sous-secrétaire des Affaires extérieures Lester B. Pearson ont refusé
d’appuyer l’action militaire britannique en Égypte, choisissant plutôt de collaborer
avec les Nations Unies afin de résoudre le conflit. Le Canada parut alors déclarer une
fois pour toute son indépendance par rapport à la mère patrie. Toutefois, les
documents sonores montrent que politiciens et diplomates canadiens ne
considéraient pas qu’ils avaient cessé de travailler pour ce qu’ils croyaient être le bien
de la Grande-Bretagne. À leurs yeux, le problème était plutôt que la Grande-Bretagne
avait temporairement perdu de vue ses meilleurs intérêts et ceux du monde
occidental. Au cours des années qui ont immédiatement suivi la crise de Suez, l’appui
des politiques britanniques demeura une priorité pour les diplomates canadiens,
notamment Arnold Smith, ambassadeur du Canada en Égypte de1958 à1960. Celui-ci
allait jouer un rôle important dans la reprise des relations entre la Grande-Bretagne
et l’Égypte. Inspiré des documents inutilisés des anciens dossiers du ministère des
Affaires extérieures, cet article décrit le point de vue des Canadiens à l’égard des
relations du Canada et de la politique britannique au Moyen-Orient durant et après la
crise de Suez. Il démontre que le un récit privilégiant le passage du statut de colonie à
celui de pays ne convient pas à l’étude de la relation anglo-canadienne dans les
années qui ont suivi la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Le contexte plus large des
politiques de la guerre froide doit être pris en considération. L’article montre
également qu’en dépit de différences superficielles, les politiques étrangères des
gouvernement libéral de St Laurent et conservateur de Diefenbaker contiennent
d’importants éléments de continuité.
Suez and After: Canada and British Policy in the
Middle East, 1956–1960
JANICE CAVELL
Abstract
The Suez crisis is generally considered to be a decisive turning-point in
Canada’s relations with Great Britain. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and
Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester Pearson refused to support
Britain’s military action in Egypt, choosing instead to work through the United
Nations for a resolution of the conflict. It seemed that Canada was repudiating
a subservient role and declaring its final independence from the mother coun-
try. However, the documentary record shows that Canadian politicians and
diplomats were in fact eager to work for what they believed to be Britain’s
good. In their view, Britain had temporarily lost sight of its own, and the west-
ern world’s, best interests. During the years immediately after Suez, support for
British policies was a priority of Canadian diplomats, most notably Arnold
Smith, Canada’s ambassador to Egypt from 1958 to 1960. Smith played an
important role in the resumption of diplomatic relations between Britain and
Egypt. Drawing on previously unused documents in the files of the Department
of External Affairs, this paper outlines Canadian views of, and Canada’s rela-
tionship to, British policy in the Middle East during and after Suez. It
demonstrates that a “colony to nation” framework is inadequate for the study
of the Anglo-Canadian relationship in the years following World War II.
Instead, the broader context of Cold War politics must be taken into consider-
ation. The paper also shows that despite the surface differences between
Liberal and Conservative foreign policy, there were strong elements of conti-
nuity between the St. Laurent and Diefenbaker governments.
Résumé
La crise de Suez est généralement considérée comme un tournant décisif dans
les relations entre le Canada et la Grande-Bretagne. Le premier ministre Louis
St-Laurent et le sous-secrétaire des Affaires extérieures Lester B. Pearson ont
refusé d’appuyer l’action militaire britannique en Égypte, choisissant plutôt de
collaborer avec les Nations Unies afin de résoudre le conflit. Le Canada parut
alors déclarer une fois pour toute son indépendance par rapport à la mère
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patrie. Toutefois, les documents sonores montrent que politiciens et diplomates
canadiens ne considéraient pas qu’ils avaient cessé de travailler pour ce qu’ils
croyaient être le bien de la Grande-Bretagne. À leurs yeux, le problème était
plutôt que la Grande-Bretagne avait temporairement perdu de vue ses
meilleurs intérêts et ceux du monde occidental. Au cours des années qui ont
immédiatement suivi la crise de Suez, l’appui des politiques britanniques
demeura une priorité pour les diplomates canadiens, notamment Arnold Smith,
ambassadeur du Canada en Égypte de1958 à1960. Celui-ci allait jouer un rôle
important dans la reprise des relations entre la Grande-Bretagne et l’Égypte.
Inspiré des documents inutilisés des anciens dossiers du ministère des Affaires
extérieures, cet article décrit le point de vue des Canadiens à l’égard des rela-
tions du Canada et de la politique britannique au Moyen-Orient durant et
après la crise de Suez. Il démontre que le un récit privilégiant le passage du
statut de colonie à celui de pays ne convient pas à l’étude de la relation anglo-
canadienne dans les années qui ont suivi la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Le
contexte plus large des politiques de la guerre froide doit être pris en consid-
ération. L’article montre également qu’en dépit de différences superficielles,
les politiques étrangères des gouvernement libéral de St Laurent et conserva-
teur de Diefenbaker contiennent d’importants éléments de continuité.
Canada and Britain at the End of Empire
The Suez crisis of 1956 precipitated the most dramatic divergence betweenBritish and Canadian foreign policy of the entire twentieth century. The
result was bitter humiliation for Britain and diplomatic triumph for Canada,
with the Canadian minister for external affairs, Lester Pearson, being awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in resolving the crisis. It is, therefore, natural
enough that 1956 should be seen in retrospect as the definitive parting of the
ways between the mother country and the former colony — the “de facto end
of the British Empire in Canada,”1 as two prominent historians have described
1 Norman Hillmer and J. L. Granatstein, Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s, 1st
ed. (Toronto: Copp Clark Longman, 1994), 226. Elsewhere, Granatstein describes the support for
British actions in Canada as “the last gasp of the oldAnglocentrism.” In his view, “The old Canada
was going, and the Suez crisis and the responses it provoked demonstrated that fact.” Twentieth
Century Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1986), 307. According to Robert
Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canadian officials found it “galling” and “infuriat-
ing” that “the British were fumbling back into their discarded colonial costumes, picking up the
imperial elephant gun, and going hunting for an ‘emerging nation.’” Canada Since 1945: Power,
Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 143. See also John
English, The Worldly Years: The Life of Lester Pearson, Volume II: 1949–1972 (Toronto: Knopf,
1992), 130, 135, 144-5; José W. Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in
English Canada, 1945–71 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2006), 115; and
John Melady, Pearson’s Prize: Canada and the Suez Crisis (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006), 109, 111.
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it. But many Canadians at the time were bitterly critical of the government’s
actions, feeling that Canada should have stood by Britain’s side.2 Such emo-
tions may well have contributed to the Liberals’ defeat in the 1957 federal
election. By the time Pearson actually received his Nobel Prize, his party’s 22
year monopoly of power was over. The new government was headed by John
Diefenbaker, who made no secret of his strong emotional commitment to
Britain and the Commonwealth.
Under Diefenbaker, Canadian diplomats were generally supportive of
British policy in the Middle East. In particular, the ambassador in Cairo, Arnold
Smith, played an important role in the resumption of diplomatic relations
between the United Kingdom (UK) and the United Arab Republic or UAR (the
name given to the short-lived union of Egypt and Syria between 1958 and
1961).3 Smith used his good personal relationship with Egyptian president
Gamal Abdel Nasser to promote a more positive view of British motives and
policy — no easy feat in the tense political atmosphere after Suez, which was
worsened by events such as the 1958 revolution in Iraq and by western con-
cerns about Soviet “penetration” of the Middle East. There is, however, no
evidence that this was a specifically Conservative, pro-British line imposed
from above by Diefenbaker and his secretary of state for external affairs,
Howard Green, who had both been ardent and vocal supporters of Britain in
1956. Instead, the main architect of the new policy was Smith himself, a diplo-
mat cast very much in the Pearson mould. Despite outward appearances, there
were in fact many elements of continuity between Liberal and Conservative
policies in this area.
Canada’s refusal to endorse British actions in 1956 and its support for
Britain in the years following the crisis were both dictated by the same consid-
erations: the success of the western alliance in the Cold War and the unity of
the Commonwealth.4 These were, inevitably, the main foreign policy preoccu-
pations of both the Department of External Affairs and the government in
2 See James Eayrs, “Canadian Policy and Opinion During the Suez Crisis,” International
Journal 12, no. 2 (Spring 1957): 97-108; and José W. Igartua, “‘Ready, Aye, Ready’No More?
Canada, Britain, and the Suez Crisis in the Canadian Press,” in Canada and the End of Empire,
ed. Phillip Buckner (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 47-65.
3 Canada played an even more important part in the resumption of relations between the United
Arab Republic and Australia. Since 1956 Canada had acted as the protecting power for
Australia in Egypt — the first time Canadian diplomats had taken on such a role. On the
resumption of relations with Australia, see Janice Cavell, Michael Stevenson, and Kevin
Spooner, eds., Documents on Canadian External Relations (hereafter DCER) Vol. 26 (1959)
(Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2006), documents 377-380.
4 On the importance of the Commonwealth to Canada and the other “old dominions” during the
1950s, see Francine McKenzie, “In the National Interest: Dominions’ Support for Britain and
the Commonwealth after the Second World War,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History 34, no. 4 (December 2006): 553-76.
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power, whether Liberal or Conservative. To them were added the traditional
emotional loyalties to Britain, strengthened by the close working relationship
that had long existed between External Affairs and the Foreign Office.5
Consultation between British and Canadian officials on matters relating to the
Middle East became almost non-existent in November 1956, but was especially
frequent during Smith’s first year as ambassador, when there was no British,
French, or Australian representation in Cairo.
This paper will begin with brief overviews of the British presence in the
Middle East and of Canadian policy during the 1956 crisis. It will then exam-
ine the situation at the time of Smith’s appointment (October 1958), and finally
describe Canada’s relationship to British policy in the period leading up to and
immediately following the resumption of diplomatic relations between Britain
and the UAR in December 1959. The archival evidence on Smith’s role as an
intermediary between Britain and Egypt throws new light on the relationship
between Canada and Britain at the end of empire.6 There was indisputably a
gradual loosening of ties with the mother country throughout the 1950s and
1960s, but both the emotional and the political bonds remained strong even
after Suez.7 However, my purpose is not merely to demonstrate that this was
the case. Instead, this paper will explore the complexity and subtlety of the
pragmatic political considerations linking Canada and Britain together in the
Cold War period.
By the late 1950s the Canada-UK relationship was deeply enmeshed in
broad international concerns. It is, therefore, highly misleading to interpret
Canadian actions within the framework of a “colony to nation” narrative. That
the end of empire in Canada coincided with the Cold War and decolonization
in Asia and Africa was of immense importance. Britain was far more than a
mother country (or former mother country) to Canadians in this period: it was
a Cold War ally and the leading nation in the Commonwealth. To be properly
understood, attitudes toward the UK in both the Pearsonian “golden age” and
the Diefenbaker era must be placed in an international context. The conven-
tional picture of Canadian politics and foreign policy during the years from
1956 to 1960 contrasts Liberal continentalism to a lingering colonial mentality
5 See John Hilliker and Greg Donaghy, “Canadian Relations with the United Kingdom at the
End of Empire, 1956-73,” in Canada and the End of Empire, ed. Buckner, 25-46.
6 On the chronology of imperial decline, see John Darwin, “Imperial Twilight, or When Did the
Empire End?” in ibid., 15-24.
7 The Liberal Winnipeg Free Press, which unhesitatingly condemned British actions in 1956,
nevertheless published an editorial urging readers to “Be Fair to Britain.” The writer argued that
what Britain had done “has to be condemned. There is no dodging this. The last people who
should try to dodge it are those Canadians who are most anxious to maintain Canada’s links to
Britain. ... [T]he proper role of this country is not to be indignant; it is to try to understand and
earnestly to seek ways of halting the consequences of the error.” (1 November 1956), 29.
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among the Conservatives. However, neither of these stereotypes adequately
accounts for Canadian policy during and after Suez.
Canada’s Role in the Suez Crisis
In the years before 1956 there seemed to be no connection whatever between
the Middle East and Canada’s vital interests. Britain had first been drawn into
the area by the existence of the Suez Canal. The canal, built as a commercial
enterprise by Ferdinand de Lesseps’ Compagnie universelle du canal maritime
de Suez, opened in 1869. Almost half the shares in the company were owned
by the khedive (viceroy) of Egypt, Ismail Pasha. The rest were sold to various
stockholders, mainly in France. Ismail Pasha’s shares therefore represented a
controlling interest. In 1875 Ismail’s debts forced him to sell the shares to the
British government for four million pounds, giving Britain effective control
over this exceptionally important transportation link. The canal was the route
not only to India but also to Britain’s Far Eastern and Pacific possessions. Even
after Indian independence in 1947, Australians and New Zealanders continued
to see the canal as essential to their communication with Europe. For Canada,
in contrast, nothing of importance was at stake in either the nineteenth century
or the first half of the twentieth century.
At first the British preferred to safeguard the canal by shoring up the
Ottoman Empire. So precarious, however, did Turkish rule at times seem that
Britain sent troops to Egypt in 1882, supposedly as a temporary measure.
Though without official standing in Egypt, the British stayed on and on as de
facto rulers. When Turkey entered World War I on Germany’s side, the British
government declared a protectorate over Egypt. After the war, League of
Nations mandates over Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine made Britain a major
player on the Middle Eastern scene. In Iraq and Transjordan, the British were
able to establish a fairly cordial working relationship with the Arab ruling class.
In 1922 Egypt nominally became an independent state, ruled by its own king,
but in fact British rule continued unchanged. The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of
1936 formalized the British military occupation of the Canal Zone and the naval
base at Alexandria. Throughout the inter-war years, resentment simmered, with
occasional outbreaks of violence.At the same time, the question of Jewish immi-
gration to Palestine was a focal point for resentment against Britain by all Arabs.
After World War II the Jewish issue quickly became even more explosive.
In the face of violence and terrorism from both sides, late in 1947 the British
decided to withdraw from Palestine. The state of Israel was founded in the
aftermath of their departure. At the same time, Indian independence marked
another retreat from empire. Yet despite the apparent trend, the British were not
willing to abandon their influence in the Middle East altogether, for two main
reasons: first, with the onset of the Cold War, concerns about possible Soviet
activities in the Arab world and Africa grew; and second, in the late 1940s and
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early 1950s Middle Eastern oil supplies began to be tapped on a large scale. The
British by now had long experience in Middle Eastern affairs, and they still
retained their prestige in at least some Arab countries. The United States (US),
on the other hand, had little experience or influence in the region, and because
of its support for Israel, the US was widely disliked by Arabs. The Middle East
therefore seemed destined to remain, with the tacit consent of the Americans,
one of the last outposts of empire.8
This prospect was not welcome to Egyptian nationalists. In 1952 a revolu-
tion led by young military officers overthrew the ineffective King Farouk and
replaced him with a new government, led at first by General Mohammad
Naguib. However, the real power in Egypt was the charismatic Colonel Gamal
Abdel Nasser, who became prime minister in 1954. Nasser consolidated his
power and greatly enhanced his prestige throughout the Arab world when he
successfully negotiated an agreement for gradual British withdrawal from the
Canal Zone.9 By the terms of the original agreement for the construction of the
canal, the concession granted by the Egyptian government to the Compagnie
universelle du canal maritime de Suez would expire in 1968, and the govern-
ment was under no obligation to renew it. There was now no hope that after
1968 things would continue more or less as before.
All of this was a serious blow to Britain’s (and possibly the west’s) posi-
tion, and to the pro-British upper classes in Iraq and Jordan. Nevertheless, both
Britain and the United States were at first prepared to support Nasser. Nasser,
however, demanded more than they were willing to give. He wanted arms to
protect Egypt against Israel, but the Americans and British were committed to
an arms balance between Arabs and Israelis. Nasser therefore turned to the
Soviet bloc for weapons in September 1955. In January 1956 Nasser announced
a new constitution for Egypt, with a one-party political system and himself as
president. He wanted money to build the Aswan High Dam, but at the last
8 This summary is derived mainly from Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East
1914–1971, 2nd ed. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981). A more recent general account is D.
K. Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958 (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 2006); see especially Chapter 3 on Britain’s role in Iraq. On the com-
plex status of the canal between the time of its construction and Nasser’s takeover, see Arnold
Wilson, “Some International and Legal Aspects of the Suez Canal,” Transactions of the
Grotius Society, 21 (1935): 127-47; and Caroline Piquet, “The Suez Company’s Concession in
Egypt, 1854–1956: Modern Infrastructure and Local Economic Development,” Enterprise and
Society 5, no. 1 (March 2004): 107-27, especially 111-13, 117-20. On the relationship between
British and American policy in the Middle East during the 1950s, see Tore T. Petersen, The
Middle East between the Great Powers: Anglo-American Conflict and Cooperation, 1952–7
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).
9 See Michael T. Thornhill, “Britain, the United States and the Rise of an Egyptian Leader: The
Politics and Diplomacy of Nasser’s Consolidation of Power, 1952–4,” English Historical
Review 119, no. 483 (September 2004): 892-921; and Barry Rubin, “America and the Egyptian
Revolution, 1950–1957,” Political Science Quarterly 97, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 73-90.
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moment American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles decided against the
deal. In July 1956 Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, declaring that he would
use the revenues to finance the dam.
To British prime minister Anthony Eden, this move was clear proof that
Nasser was another Hitler, who would continue to push for concessions until he
was met with force. Though there were pragmatic reasons for the course the
British followed, there can be little doubt that Eden and his supporters were influ-
enced by nostalgia for the glory days of empire, and by fears of losing what
power and prestige they still retained in a world dominated by the United States
and the Soviet Union. The British entered into a secret plan with the French (who
feared the growth ofArab nationalism inAlgeria) and the Israelis. On 29 October
1956 Israel attacked Egypt. The British and French then sent in their own troops,
ostensibly to separate the two sides and protect the canal. The ruse deceived no
one. Eden and his supporters had expected the sympathy and support of the
Americans, and they were both amazed and outraged when they did not get it.10
St. Laurent, Pearson, and the members of the Department of External
Affairs were, in turn, astonished and offended by Eden’s display of imperial
arrogance. However, in refusing to support British actions, they did not see
themselves as asserting Canadian freedom from imperial control. Instead,
Pearson and his colleagues kept their eyes steadily on what they perceived as
the best interests of the western alliance, which were the best interests of
Canada and of Britain itself, even if the British had for the time being lost sight
of this crucial fact.11 Events in the Middle East had become of vital interest to
Canada because of their implications for the Cold War and the Commonwealth,
and this, not the quest for a foreign policy independent of Britain or for
enhanced standing at the United Nations (UN), was Pearson’s motive for
becoming actively involved in the crisis. As Canadian diplomat John Holmes
noted, “About the last thing anyone involved had time to think of was the ful-
filment of ‘Canada’s role as a middle power.’”12
For the pragmatic internationalist Pearson, the ideal situation was that
Canada and other members of NATO should be able to follow the joint Anglo-
American line at the UN without undue conflict or controversy. In the early
stages of the crisis, Pearson fretted that the British had lost their diplomatic
“sureness of touch.” He and Norman Robertson, the Canadian High
10 The best general account of the crisis is Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the
Middle East (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2001).
11 As early as September 1956 the possible effect of British and French policy on the solidarity
of the western alliance was the focus of Pearson’s concerns and a source of intense anxiety to
him. See Geoffrey Pearson, “Seize the Day: Suez, 1956,” in Seize the Day: Lester B. Pearson
and Crisis Diplomacy, Geoffrey Pearson (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 142.
12 John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943–1957,
Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 357.
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Commissioner in London, did not attempt to tell the British what they ought to
do about Suez. However, Pearson and Robertson strongly urged the Eden gov-
ernment not to act without the support of the United States and other western
countries. Surely, Pearson thought, the British could not fail to heed this advice.
But they did, and the widening gap between Britain and the US was “a night-
mare” to Pearson and many other Canadians.13 On 31 October the Canadian
ambassador in Washington, Arnold Heeney, reported that the failure of Britain
and France to consult with the US “has been as severe a shock to the USA
Government, from the President down to the most junior State Department offi-
cials, as the nature and circumstances of the Franco-British action itself. There
is no doubt whatever that this is regarded here as a very serious blow to the
Western alliance and to the cohesion of the free world.”14
Pearson condemned the British action not so much because it harked back to
the days of European colonial power as because “[t]his ill-conceived and ill-judged
enterprise ... revealed a complete misappreciation of world response.” The British
were not even astute enough to realize what theAmerican reaction would be. This,
Pearson noted, “was no situation for ‘Ready, Aye, Ready’”15 — not because
“Ready,Aye, Ready” had become unthinkable as a Canadian response, but because,
as Prime Minister St. Laurent wrote to Eden, it would be “a tragedy beyond
repair”16 ifAnglo-American cooperation came to an end. Norman Robertson told
Lord Home, the secretary of state for Commonwealth relations, that the UK and
France “had somehow got themselves into a truly tragic position. Neither of them
had any closer friend and ally than Canada, but at this pass I could not see what
we could do to help.”17 What was unthinkable was that Canada should do any-
thing to widen the growing distance between its two most important allies.
The possibility of constructive Canadian action to bring the United States
and United Kingdom back together was quickly opened up by a telegram from
Robertson. After his conversation with Lord Home, Robertson was told by
another British official, Ivone Kirkpatrick, that “no one would be better pleased
than we” if the United Nations agreed to take over the task of maintaining
13 John AMunro and Alex I. Inglis, eds., Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B.
Pearson, Vol. 2: 1948–1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 232, 227-8.
14 Heeney to Pearson, 31 October 1956, in Greg Donaghy, ed., DCER, Vol. 22 (1956–57 Part I)
(Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2001), document 111.
15 Munro and Inglis, Mike, 241, 238. In a private letter written on December 5, Pearson summed
up the entire crisis by saying that he had “great sympathy” with the British because of “their
frustrations and provocations in the Middle East over recent months” and because Dulles’ pol-
icy had been “ambiguous and inconsistent.” But, Pearson concluded, “how they expected to
correct the situation by the kind of action they took, without consultation with anybody and in
the sure knowledge that a large majority of the UN would be mobilized by the Asians and
Arabs against them, is beyond my understanding.” Quoted in ibid., 273-4.
16 St. Laurent to Eden, 31 October 1956, DCER, Vol 22, document 113.
17 Robertson to Pearson, 1 November 1956, ibid., document 116.
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peace.18 Pearson had already been mulling over plans for a UN peacekeeping
force, and this assurance that such a development would be accepted by Britain
spurred him into action. According to John Holmes, under the circumstances it
would have been “harder for Canada to sit on the sidelines than to act boldly.”19
Pearson faced a delicate and difficult task: he had to initiate United Nations
action on Suez, while at the same time ensuring that no resolution condemned
Britain and France as aggressors. He also came to realize that the British were
not wholeheartedly committed to his plan to save their face. Instead, they hoped
that their own troops would be among the peacekeepers, thus in effect giving
UN sanction to what they had done.
This Pearson was determined to prevent: again, not because he considered
the British action inherently immoral, but rather because he knew how strongly
such a development would offend the Asian members of the Commonwealth.20
It was the Indians and Pakistanis, not the Canadians, who considered the Suez
primarily as an attempt to return to nineteenth-century colonial methods. Once
more, in Canadian eyes the British had lost sight of their own true interests, for
to damage the Commonwealth would ultimately be to damage both their stand-
ing in the world and their ability to keep former colonies out of the Soviet
sphere. A division within the Commonwealth was an especially dismaying
prospect for Canada, since membership in this international association was
seen in Ottawa as an important counterweight to the strong continental pull
exerted by the United States. The two other white nations of the “Old
Commonwealth,” Australia and New Zealand, firmly supported British actions.
While the South African government officially remained aloof and uncommit-
ted on Suez, popular sentiment among the whites there ran strongly in favour
of Britain. This added urgency to Canadian concerns about the Commonwealth,
and Pearson was determined to demonstrate that at least one white member of
the association was sympathetic to the Afro-Asian point of view.21
Pearson was certainly hurt that neither the British themselves nor the
Canadian public22 appreciated that his efforts were made on Britain’s behalf. So
focused, in fact, had he been on saving Britain’s face that there was little time
to spare for the other major crisis of 1956, the Soviet invasion of Hungary. The
Canadian High Commissioner in New Delhi, Escott Reid, sympathized with
18 Robertson to Pearson, 1 November 1956, ibid., document 118.
19 Holmes, The Shaping of Peace, 357.
20 Munro and Inglis, Mike, 244, 253.
21 On Pearson’s success in achieving this goal, see Escott Reid, Hungary and Suez 1956: A View
from New Delhi (Oakville, Ont.: Mosaic Press, 1986), 72. On the Commonwealth and Suez,
see also Peter Lyon, “The Commonwealth and the Suez Crisis,” in Suez 1956: The Crisis and
its Consequences, ed. William Roger Louis and Roger Owens (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989),
257-3.
22 Munro and Inglis, Mike, 273-4.
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Indian anger over Suez, believing that due to an unjustifiable double standard
Canada had judged British aggression far less harshly than it deserved. Reid
was convinced that if a more balanced stand had been taken, Canada could have
inspired a prompt public condemnation of the Soviet action from India. For the
expression of these views, Reid earned only a sharp rebuke from Pearson (so
sharp that an aghast Robertson protested on Reid’s behalf).23
There is no reason to believe that Pearson became in any way embittered
against the British because of Eden’s thankless attitude. Pearson was well
aware that there was strong opposition to Eden’s action in Britain, and even
among members of Eden’s own government. “There is no doubt in my mind
now that the whole ill-conceived and ill-judged enterprise, at least on the
British side, was Eden’s,” Pearson reported after a visit to London in
December.24 In January 1957 Eden resigned and was replaced as prime minis-
ter by the more realistic Harold Macmillan (who had abandoned the pro-Suez
group during the later part of the crisis). The way was now clear for Canada to
rebuild a cordial relationship with the United Kingdom, and had the Liberals
remained in power, they would undoubtedly have done so.
The Conservative Government and Anglo-Egyptian Relations
When John Diefenbaker was elected in 1957, his government’s interactions
with British officials did not initially include any significant discussions of
Middle Eastern affairs. But even before the change of government, Arnold
Smith had envisioned enhanced communication and consultation on the post-
Suez situation in Egypt, and his initiatives would ultimately lead to close
cooperation between Canada and the United Kingdom on the Middle East.
Smith fits the stereotype of an “Ottawa man” in the Pearson era almost per-
fectly. He came from a privileged background, was well-educated, and moved
easily in the upper levels of British and international society. The British and
Commonwealth connections were extremely important to him, as his work for
the Commonwealth Secretariat in the 1960s would demonstrate.25 Born in
Toronto in 1915, Smith was educated at Upper Canada College, with a year at
a Swiss lycée in 1927–1928. He graduated from the University of Toronto in
1935 and won a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford. In 1939–1940 he taught polit-
ical economy at the University of Tartu in Estonia and acted as press attaché of
the British Legation. In 1940–1943 Smith was in Cairo, where he taught at the
23 Reid, Hungary and Suez 1956, 40-1, 133, 142.
24 Pearson to St. Laurent, 18 December 1956, DCER, Vol. 22, document 202; see also Munro and
Inglis, Mike, 253, 241.
25 SeeArnold Smith (with Clyde Sanger), Stitches in Time: The Commonwealth in World Politics
(Don Mills, Ont.: General Publishing, 1981). In 1965 Smith became the first Secretary-
General of the Commonwealth.
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Egyptian State University. Again, he worked for the British Embassy. He joined
the Canadian diplomatic service in December 1942 and was posted to the
Soviet Union in 1943–1945. Later postings included New York, Brussels, and
Cambodia. Early in 1956 he was appointed counsellor at the Canadian High
Commission in London. In London Smith was very much at home, being on
close personal terms with senior members of the Foreign Office. He was well
placed to observe the deterioration of British-Canadian relations during the
Suez crisis. And, at a time when official contact was at an all-time low, Smith
was able to provide crucial information on British thinking. Early in the crisis
Smith sent Norman Robertson a detailed and accurate appraisal of British
motives, based on conversations with a Foreign Office associate.26
Smith had a particular interest in the Middle East and the Islamic world,
arising from his years in Cairo and from the influence of his brother, Wilfred
Cantwell Smith, the author of Modern Islam in India (1943) and Islam in
Modern History (1957).27 After Suez, Smith was quick to see the opportunity
for Canada in the absence of British diplomatic representation at Cairo. Cairo,
as he later wrote, was in his eyes “one of the most fascinating of diplomatic
posts,”28 the key to the Middle East and North Africa. With this important lis-
tening-post unavailable to the British, there was a gap which Canadian reports
might fill, thereby helping to heal the breach in Anglo-Canadian relations cre-
ated by Suez.
Such a policy could also give Canada the opportunity to subtly shape
British perceptions of and responses to the Middle Eastern situation. An April
1957 telegram from the High Commission to Ottawa, probably written by
Smith, suggested that there were “particular reasons for giving info on Egypt to
the UK where this seems likely to assist them in developing constructive poli-
cies, or avoiding rash ones.”29 When the Middle Eastern heads of posts met
with Pearson in London in May 1957, Smith “emphasized the desirability of
26 The memo was immediately forwarded to Pearson and clearly played a role in his assessment
of the situation. Smith reported that the decision had been “imposed from the top by Eden and
Macmillan” and that Eden was “in a highly emotional state.” Smith’s informant had gone so
far as to call Eden “neurotic,” but he also noted the intense frustration caused in London by
Dulles’ mixed signals. Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), Lester B. Pearson
Papers, Series N5, Vol. 26, Robertson to Pearson, 1 November 1956, and enclosure, Smith to
Robertson, 1 November 1956.
27 Wilfred Smith was the founder of the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University. He also
taught at Harvard and Dalhousie. In the aftermath of the Suez crisis, he wrote a letter to the
Conservative Montreal Gazette expressing support for Pearson’s policies. Wilfred Smith was
dismayed by the caricatured view of Egypt so prevalent in the west, a feeling which it may
fairly be inferred was shared by his brother. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, “Solution Not
Adjudication Need In Mid-East,” Gazette (5 February 1957), 8.
28 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5840, file 50134-40, Arnold Smith, Cairo letter 283, 17 May 1960.
29 Ibid., Vol. 7794, file 12554-E-40, London to External telegram 755, 15 April 1957.
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increasing the amount of material passed to the United Kingdom Foreign
Office.” He argued that “quite apart from the desirability of reciprocating the
flow of material which Canada House traditionally receive[s] by reason of its
special relationship with the C.R.O. [Commonwealth Relations Office] and the
Foreign Office, we should not overlook the fact that the timely transmission of
Canadian information emanating from sources, such as Cairo, where the United
Kingdom is not represented, would enable us on occasion to exercise a useful
influence on United Kingdom policy.” This was agreed to.30
The first secretary in Cairo, Arthur Kilgour, summed up the consensus at
the meeting when he observed that Nasser was “not to be ‘brought around’ by
economic pressure.” Efforts to isolate Nasser “economically or for that matter
politically” had “just the wrong effect.” Such efforts merely “tended to increase
his obduracy and to estrange him further from the West.” Kilgour added that it
was “doubtful if such pressure had a desirable effect on other Arab leaders, who
might feel driven to give some support to Nasser in his difficulties although
fundamentally they would prefer to have friendly relations with the West.”
Nasser’s regime “was undoubtedly exasperating to deal with,” but this was no
reason to conclude that a satisfactory relationship with it could never be
attained. The Canadians evidently saw their role as that of persuading the
British to take a similar view. John Watkins, the ambassador to the Soviet
Union, remarked that the British “probably had retained much more influence
than they thought in the Middle East,” and that their position there might yet be
restored. Even the Soviets, he suggested, would prefer this to American domi-
nation of the region.31
The ambassador to Egypt, R. M. Macdonnell, raised the issue of the possi-
ble resumption of diplomatic relations between the UK and Nasser’s
government. The implication that Canada might take on the role of facilitating
this outcome was clear, but Pearson quickly intervened, warning that “Canadian
representatives should be careful about any United Kingdom approach designed
to have Canada act on behalf of the United Kingdom with a view to the resump-
tion of relations with Egypt.”32 Pearson did not give his reasons for this view,
30 Ibid., H. B. Robinson, “Meeting of Heads of Canadian Posts in the Middle East, London, May
5 to 7, 1957. Exchange of Information on the Middle Eastern Question with Other
Governments,” 16 May 1957.
31 Ibid., H. B. Robinson, “Meeting of Heads of Canadian Posts in the Middle East, London, May
5 to 7, 1957. Relations with Egypt.” Kilgour’s comments refer to the British belief that by not
concluding a financial agreement with Nasser, thus keeping Egyptian assets in the United
Kingdom and United States blocked, they could weaken his regime. The British were deter-
mined that any financial settlement must not be on terms that could be interpreted as a victory
for Nasser.
32 Ibid. On British discussions during 1957 regarding the possible resumption of relations, see
Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952–1967
(London and Portland: Frank Cass, 2003), 71-3.
168
JOURNAL OF THE CHA 2007 REVUE DE LA S.H.C.
but it is easy to guess that he feared the matter would not go smoothly, leading
to further divisive debates at home in Canada. As a result of Pearson’s stance,
the increased communication advocated by Smith was not immediately
matched by any rise in active Canadian involvement with British policy on the
Middle East.
However, the amount of information to be shared was growing at a signif-
icant rate. At the time of Suez, Middle Eastern questions were the responsibility
of a single External Affairs officer in Ottawa. By the time of Smith’s appoint-
ment as ambassador to the United Arab Republic in the fall of 1958, there was
a Middle Eastern Division with a staff of seven officers. Canada had established
embassies in Israel and Lebanon, and was about to open a legation in Iran. Sir
Roger Stevens, the British deputy under secretary responsible for the Middle
East, was a keen advocate of the new Canadian missions, and expressed a
strong wish that Canada should also be represented in Iraq.33 The volume of
reporting from the Middle East had risen enormously.34 However, the
Conservative government had not yet used these reports as the basis for a strong
new line on Middle Eastern policy.
A few months before Smith went to Cairo, the British position in the
Middle East suffered another major setback with the Iraqi revolution of July
1958. The pro-British regime of Nuri as-Said could not endure once Britain had
fought against an Arab country in collusion with Israel. Nuri, the young King
Feisal II, and several other members of the Hashemite royal family were bru-
tally murdered. An army officer, Abdel Karim Qasim, became the country’s
new ruler. Initially, it seemed that Iraq might move towards a union with Egypt.
By the autumn of 1958 the British view of Nasser was more restrained than
in 1956, but still one of suspicion and intense dislike. The foreign secretary, John
Selwyn Lloyd, had supported Eden during the crisis. He now remarked that
Nasser “suffered from schizophrenia: there was one side of him which would
like to have an accommodation with the West, but there was another which had
dreams of a Middle Eastern and African Empire which could only be procured
at the expense of Western interests.”35 The British particularly feared and
resented Nasser’s reported attempts to undermine the governments of neigh-
bouring countries. If the majority of Arab countries were ruled by nationalist
governments closely allied with Nasser’s Egypt, then cooperation among them
might result in an increase in the price of oil. For Britain, dependent on Middle
33 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7794, file 12554-40, London to External telegram 4649, 19 December 1958.
34 SeeAlan Harvey, “Canada Bolstering Middle East Diplomacy,” Ottawa Journal (31 December
1958). Some journalists called for even more extensive Canadian representation in the region.
For example, see Peter Worthington, “Wanted: Canadian Diplomats in the Middle East,”
Saturday Night (1 August 1959): 14-15, 39.
35 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7810, file 12653-Y-40, Conversation between the Secretary of State and the
Israeli Ambassador, 2 May 1958 (extract from United Kingdom Foreign Office paper).
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Eastern oil supplies, this possibility was far more worrisome than it was for the
United States. A Nasser-inspired coup in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait could have
severe economic consequences for Britain. Smith was made aware of these
views in a meeting with Stevens just before he left London for Cairo.36
The British welcomed reports that Qasim intended to resist closer associa-
tion with the UnitedArab Republic, and downplayed his reliance on Communist
elements within his government. Since “many of their old contacts were still in
responsible positions in Iraq,”37 the British hoped eventually to establish cor-
dial relations with Qasim. The British ambassador in Iraq, Sir Michael Wright,
argued that Qasim was only using the Communists and that once he was more
firmly established he would take action against them, maintaining a neutral
stance between east and west. A second revolt might well bring a pro-Nasser
faction to power, and so must be avoided “for [Britain’s] own good and for the
good of Iraq.”38 The British now wanted a financial settlement and diplomatic
relations with the UAR, but had “no intention of treating Nasser as a white-
haired boy and their best friend in the Mideast.”39
The Americans, in contrast, hoped to bring about a substantial improve-
ment in western relations with Nasser. They were also far more apprehensive
than the British about the apparent drift of Iraq into the Soviet orbit. The visit
of American Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree to Cairo in mid-
December 195840 gave rise to cautious optimism in Washington. President
Eisenhower “admitted that Nasser has grown up a little” and thought that the
Egyptian leader “could oppose [Middle Eastern] Communists better than the
U.S.”41 The Americans were highly gratified when Nasser denounced
Communism as the enemy of Arab nationalism in a speech delivered on 23
December. American aid to the UAR, which had been only about a million dol-
lars a year in 1957 and 1958, rose to 150 million dollars in 1959.42
At this time Smith and other Canadian officials were “increasingly
concerned” about “the growing divergence of opinion ... between the UK and
the USA assessments.”43 Smith’s own opinion was initially much more
36 Ibid., Arnold Smith, London to External letter 1142, 4 June 1958, and London to External
telegram 3834, 2 October 1958. Stevens, who impressed Smith very favourably as “intelligent,
vigorous, and open minded,” emphasized “the handicap under which the UK labours through
lack of a mission in Cairo and said that he would appreciate our passing to the FO as many
reports from Cairo as we can.”
37 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7812, file 50351-40, London to External telegram 4281, 14 November 1958.
38 Ibid., London to External telegram 4566, 12 December 1958.
39 Ibid., Vol. 7810, file 12653-Y-40, London to External telegram 3, 2 January 1959.
40 See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vol. XIII (hereafter FRUS)
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), document 229.
41 Ibid., document 230.
42 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5549, file 12653-I-40, Cairo to External telegram 14, 7 January 1961.
43 Ibid., Vol. 7154, file 9200-40, London to External telegram 4590, 16 December 1958.
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in harmony with the American view. He believed the Communists were
steadily strengthening their position in Iraq, and noted that Egyptian leaders
were “disquieted” to find that the result of the Iraqi revolution might not be
“an extension of Arab nationalism as they have understood it,” but rather the
“advance into [the] Mideast of a new Russian imperialism which takes over
from British the tactics of supporting an anti-Egyptian régime in Iraq.”44 He
was dismayed to hear that Sir Michael Wright in Baghdad had warned Qasim
of a planned coup. (The Americans shared this view of the incident, observing
that Wright had “played [the] Communist game.”)45 In Smith’s view the situ-
ation afforded the western powers an ideal opportunity to rebuild their
relations with Nasser, and any British support for Qasim was, under the cir-
cumstances, extremely ill-advised. He warned that the “present malleable
situation, if misunderstood and mishandled, could result in a still further dete-
rioration of western position in [the] UAR.”46 To prevent such an outcome,
Arab nationalism should be discreetly encouraged as the best alternative to
Communism.
In January 1959 a British mission led by Colin Crowe arrived in Cairo,
hoping to finalize the financial agreement and to negotiate the resumption of
full diplomatic relations with the UAR. The British feared that the Egyptians
would offer only consular representation, and that without full diplomatic priv-
ileges they would not be able to protect the interests of British nationals seeking
the return of their confiscated property. Crowe was in constant touch with the
Canadian embassy, not least because the British urgently required the use of
Canadian cipher facilities. All confidential communications between the mis-
sion and the Foreign Office were sent from the Canadian embassy to Ottawa,
and from Ottawa to London.
Relations between Smith and Crowe appear to have been extremely cordial
on both the personal and the professional levels. Crowe read some of Smith’s
despatches to Ottawa and encouraged the idea that they should be shared with
the Foreign Office.47 He consulted Smith as well as the American ambassador,
Raymond Hare, on many details of the negotiations. In talks with various
Egyptian officials (with whom he had established excellent relations), Smith
sought to allay the profound suspicion of the UK as the enemy of Arab nation-
alism that still prevailed in Cairo.48 Ali Sabry, the Egyptian minister for
presidential affairs, told Smith that he feared the British intended to encourage
44 Cairo to External telegram 3, 12 January 1959, DCER, Vol. 26, document 363.
45 FRUS, Vol. XIII, document 229.
46 Cairo to External telegram 3.
47 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7812, file 12653-AB-40, Cairo to External telegram 48, 26 January 1959.
48 For example, see ibid., Vol. 7810, file 12653-Y-40, Cairo to External telegram 25, 21 January
1959; Cairo to External telegram 57, 28 January 1959; and Cairo to External telegram 253, 26
March 1959.
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Communism in Iraq, resulting in a western boycott of Iraqi oil, which would in
turn reduce the country to “bankruptcy and social chaos.” Then the British
would support a coup by a “strong man ... who would reestablish a regime
rather like that of Nuri Said.” Smith replied “that personally I had considered
some aspects of UK Mideast policy at times unwise and even foolish, but that
I knew it was not ... deviously Machiavellian …. Every responsible and intelli-
gent person in the west recognized that the future of Mideast would be
determined by actions of Mideast peoples themselves, unless of course they
invited in the Russians.” He pointed out that the British were “very much on
[the] defensive” in the region.49
The financial agreement was signed on 28 February. However, there was
no provision for the resumption of formal relations even at the consular level.
Crowe, therefore, remained dependent on Canadian facilities as he worked to
implement the agreement. Despite the excellent relations between the two men,
when Smith heard rumours of another impending coup attempt in Iraq (possi-
bly with Egyptian and American backing), he did not pass this information to
Crowe. To Ottawa, Smith explained that he did not “think it would be in UK
interest or that of the west in general to tip off [Qasim] again, and I would not
... want to be a party to any such action.” He feared that any leak to the British
might compromise Canada’s “reputation here for independence of view.”50
However, this action clearly went against the grain: Smith wrote that he
“greatly dislike[d] the idea of withholding from our UK friends reports of
developments in which they would presumably be closely interested.”51
The attempted coup took the form of a revolt in the Iraqi city of Mosul. It
was quickly put down by forces loyal to Qasim. From this point forward, Smith
was increasingly receptive to the British view that, whatever his failings, Qasim
had the ability to maintain power and was, therefore, the best hope for stability
in Iraq. At the same time, the failure of the Mosul revolt to topple Qasim forced
Nasser to acknowledge what Smith called the “inadequacy if not ... indeed the
bankruptcy of his essentially revolutionary foreign policy of recent years.”52 As
a result, the Egyptian president became slightly more willing to pursue a mod-
erate policy towards both Iraq and the United Kingdom.
Near the end of March, the British High Commission in Ottawa informed
External Affairs that the UK intended to sell military equipment, including
Canberra bombers and Centurion tanks, to Iraq in order to keep Qasim from
any further drift towards Moscow. “UK government accepts that UAR will mis-
interpret or misrepresent their action, but [Sir Humphrey] Trevelyan thinks
49 Ibid., Vol. 7154, file 9200-40, Cairo to External telegram 56, 28 January 1959.
50 Ibid., Cairo to External telegram 89, 7 February 1959.
51 Ibid., Cairo to External telegram 94, 9 February 1959.
52 Ibid., Vol. 5840, file 50134-40, Cairo to External telegram 654, 4 August 1959.
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there is a good chance that Cairo will not learn of action for some time,” Smith
was informed. Ottawa considered it “unlikely” that the sale would remain
secret for long, and accordingly encouraged the British to give Nasser advance
notice.53 Smith emphatically agreed, as did Crowe.54
Several of Smith’s telegrams on this matter were read by Selwyn Lloyd,
and they influenced his decision to make an approach to Nasser.55 The British
informally inquired whether Smith “could be used as the channel of communi-
cation.”56 Ever mindful of the need to keep Anglo-American relations on a
cordial basis, External Affairs first ascertained through the embassy in
Washington that the Americans, though not enthusiastic about the British plan,
were willing for it to go ahead. Ambassador Heeney reported that the
Americans readily admitted they had “virtually no capacity to influence the
course of events in Iraq, as the UK still has,” and that they were, therefore,
“content to let the UK make the running there.”57 However, Ottawa pointed out
to Smith that “the use of a purely Canadian channel would defeat much of the
purpose of having the U.K. inform the U.A.R. in advance.” Prime Minister
Diefenbaker was consulted, and he decided that Crowe should deliver the mes-
sage if possible; Smith would, if necessary, arrange an interview with “a
suitably senior UAR minister.”58 But when the British message was ready,
Selwyn Lloyd – evidently fearing a rebuff or insult related to Crowe’s lack of
diplomatic status – again “urgently” asked that Smith deliver it.59
Unfortunately, Smith was absent from Cairo when permission to do so
arrived from Ottawa. Crowe’s request for a meeting was flatly rejected by the
Egyptian foreign minister, Zulficar Sabri, one of the most anti-British members
of the government. Smith, however, was able to obtain a two-hour interview
with Nasser, who “received thoughtfully and very well the letter and my ampli-
fying comments.” Nasser “appeared to understand and respect” the British
decision and “expressed warm appreciation of our action in delivering UK mes-
sage and discussing matter with him.” On the subject of diplomatic relations,
Smith argued that without an exchange of ambassadors and views, the UK and
the UAR would only become more estranged. As matters stood, the Egyptians
53 Ibid., Vol. 8412, file 11044-CF-40, External to Cairo telegram ME-62, 27 March 1959. See
also M. K. Ewans to E. R. Rettie, 31 March 1959, on the same file.
54 Ibid., Cairo to External telegrams 213 and 264, 28 March 1959.
55 Ibid., Washington to External telegram 807, 3 April 1959.
56 See ibid., London to External telegrams 956 and 957, 31 March 1959; and External to London
telegram ME-69, 3 April 1959.
57 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 6093, file 503510-40, Washington to External telegram 915, 16 April 1959.
58 Memo for the Prime Minister, 2 April 1959, DCER, Vol. 26, document 364.
59 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7810, file 12653-Y-40, Foreign Office to UK Delegation Cairo 172, 6 May
1959. The message (Foreign Office to UK Delegation Cairo 173, 6 May 1959) and Selwyn
Lloyd’s suggestions for additional points Smith might make in conversation (Foreign Office to
UK Delegation Cairo 174, 6 May 1959) are also on this file.
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had to rely on possibly inaccurate press reports for their picture of British pol-
icy. Smith suggested that Nasser “could gain a great deal by having an
intelligent and able representative in London ... [and] a good UK ambassador
in Cairo.” He told Nasser that “[a]mbassadors of democratic countries usually
tended to grasp and sympathize with the legitimate interests and viewpoints of
the countries in which they live, and were thus often the most persuasive and
effective advocates within their own government machine of the views of the
governments to which they are accredited.”
Nasser acknowledged the truth of Smith’s statements but asked, “What do
you want me to do? Do you expect me to welcome the British in Cairo with open
arms after all that they have done, not ... only in November 1956 but subse-
quently?” This question, Smith noted, seemed to reflect “genuine perplexity,” and
Nasser appeared eager for a discussion of the matter. Smith replied that policy
disagreements should not preclude diplomatic relations. “Exchanging representa-
tives,” he argued, “should not ... be considered the reward for acceptable
behaviour, or a point for bargaining to induce a more welcome policy, but rather
an essential instrument and first step in making possible a gradual improvement
in relations.” Nasser “listened thoughtfully to this and [said] that he intended to
undertake a re-examination of the whole subject of relations with [the] UK.”60
Selwyn Lloyd observed that this response was “much more favourable
than we could reasonably have hoped.”61 He reported to Macmillan that “it
seems as though Colonel Nasser and his colleagues are prepared to think again
about their relationship with this country. Although I still fundamentally dis-
trust him, I think it is wholly to our advantage to procure a détente in our
relations.”62 Sir Roger Stevens told Canadian officials in London that he
“regarded Nasser’s reaction to Smith’s approach as a fact of the greatest polit-
ical importance.”63 Excerpts from Smith’s reports were also passed on to the
Americans, and the embassy in Washington reported that the State Department
was “surprised and gratified [by] Nasser’s well-balanced reaction to the UK
proposal ... and paid tribute to our ambassador’s part in bringing about this
favourable reaction.”64
Unfortunately, the more harmonious atmosphere was quickly destroyed by
an indiscreet comment from John Profumo (then minister of state for foreign
affairs) in the British House of Commons. In response to charges from the
opposition that the arms sale would damage British relations with Egypt,
Profumo revealed that Nasser had been told about it in advance and had not
60 Cairo to External telegram 419, 11 May 1959, DCER, Vol. 26, document 365.
61 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7810, file 12653-Y-40, Foreign Office to UK Delegation Cairo 199, 15 May
1959.
62 Quoted in McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the Balance of Power, 154.
63 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7810, file 12653-Y-40, London to External telegram 1486, 12 May 1959.
64 Ibid., Vol. 7812, file 12653-AB-40, Washington to External telegram 1280, 28 May 1959.
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objected.65 Nasser was infuriated by the implication that he had endorsed the
British action and, for a time, he claimed to believe that he had been deliber-
ately duped. In the subsequent media coverage, an Egyptian radio station
revealed that Smith had acted as the channel of communication. Smith strongly
recommended that no statement be made on the matter in Ottawa, since further
publicity could only damage Canada’s generally very positive image in
Egypt.66 The British took a conciliatory and apologetic line, with the result that
Nasser’s resentment quickly subsided.
In response to Smith’s report that Nasser seemed willing to review and
reconsider his policy towards the United Kingdom, Selwyn Lloyd requested
that Smith “take a suitable opportunity of pursuing the matter with the Egyptian
government.” He noted that it would be extremely useful if Smith could correct
Nasser’s “apparent misconceptions of United Kingdom policy.”67 Smith
accordingly had “a number of talks” with various ministers and officials, in
which he emphasized his hope for more normal relations between the UK and
the UAR. He usually received “indefinite, though not ... discouraging, rejoin-
ders,” and was repeatedly assured that Nasser “really was studying seriously
the question of relations with [the] UK.”68 In October 1959 Smith had another
long discussion with Nasser, who told him that diplomatic relations with the
UK were “definitely on the agenda,” since without British and French repre-
sentation in Cairo, the UAR might develop an undesirable bias towards
the Communist view.69 Smith summed up Egyptian feelings on the matter by
saying that the government’s decision was caused not by “any particular affec-
tion for British blue eyes,” but rather by “their analysis of the dangers of
Communism in Mideast and Africa, their assessment of the general balance of
political forces, and their appreciation of long term UAR interests.”70
65 United Kingdom, House of Commons, Debates, Vol. 605 (1958–1959), 839.
66 Smith’s role as intermediary between the United Kingdom and Nasser received little publicity
in Canada. For one of the few Canadian articles on the subject, see David Willcock, “How Mr.
Smith Helped Britain and Nasser Make Up,”Weekend Magazine 10, no. 21 (21 May 1960): 2-
4. The episode was subsequently forgotten. It is not discussed in the major works concerned
with Diefenbaker’s foreign policy: Denis Smith, Rogue Tory: The Life and Legend of John G.
Diefenbaker (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter & Ross, 1995); Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker’s
World: A Populist in Foreign Affairs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); and John
F. Hilliker, “The Politicians and the ‘Pearsonalities’”: The Diefenbaker Government and the
Conduct of Canadian External Relations,” Canadian Historical Association Historical Papers
(1984): 152-67. Nor is it mentioned in John Hilliker and Donald Barry, Canada’s Department
of External Affairs, Volume II: Coming of Age, 1946–1968 (Ottawa: The Institute of Public
Administration of Canada/ McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995).
67 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7810, file 12653-Y-40, F. E. Cumming-Bruce to Norman Robertson, 8 June
1959.
68 Ibid., Vol. 7811, file 12653-Y-40, Cairo to External telegram 642, 3 August 1959.
69 Ibid., Vol. 5840, file 50134-40, Cairo to External telegram 948, 19 October 1959.
70 Ibid., Vol. 7807, file 12653-I-40, Cairo to External telegram 1071, 24 November 1959.
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The resumption of diplomatic relations was announced on 1 December.71
On the same day, Selwyn Lloyd sent a personal message to Howard Green,
thanking him and Smith for their assistance, and noting that “[w]ithout your aid
we should have had a great deal more difficulty in arranging for the resumption
of relations and over other problems.” Green replied, “We welcomed the oppor-
tunity to extend any help within our capacity.”72 This satisfactory conclusion to
joint British-Canadian efforts in Cairo did not, however, signal a period of com-
plete harmony either in the two countries’ views on Middle Eastern policy or in
British relations with the UAR.
By the autumn of 1959 Ottawa was increasingly reluctant to endorse
British views on Iraq. This trend was apparently sparked by G. G. Riddell of
the Middle Eastern Division, who peppered the margins of various documents
on the subject with sardonic comments on Qasim and on British diplomacy. At
the same time, disagreements over Iraq and Israel slowed the progress of better
British relations with the UAR. Privately, Nasser and other Egyptian politicians
confided to Smith that they would be willing to make a peaceful settlement with
Israel, but they did not as yet dare to mention such a possibility in public. Many
formidable obstacles stood in the way of a settlement and there were, in Smith’s
words, “no grounds at all for complacency” about either UK-UAR relations or
the Middle Eastern situation in general.73 In May 1960 Smith noted the “evi-
dent hesitation by the U.A.R. leaders to consolidate further the improved
political relations with the U.K.”74 All this, however, mattered less and less in
terms of Anglo-Egyptian relations because, as Selwyn Lloyd informed the
meeting of Commonwealth prime ministers in the same month, the United
Kingdom had decided “to disengage from the political conflicts between Arab
States.” The problems of the Middle East, Lloyd conceded, “could best be tack-
led through the United Nations since any unilateral approach seemed inevitably
to rouse suspicions.”75
When Smith left Cairo in January 1961, he reported unhappily that in his
last conversation with Nasser, the Egyptian leader had taken a highly belliger-
ent and anti-western stance. Nasser remarked that he did not “really need
[London] or [Washington], whereas they did need to preserve their interests in
the Middle East.” In response, Smith expressed concern about the possibility of
a “downward spiral” in relations, and he once again pointed out that there was
71 Debates, Vol. 614 (1959–1960), 1011-13.
72 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7811, file 12653-Y-40, Selwyn Lloyd to Green, 1 December 1959, and
Green to Selwyn Lloyd.
73 Arnold Smith, memo for the Prime Minister, 8 September 1960, in Janice Cavell, ed., DCER,
Vol. 27 (1960) (Ottawa: ForeignAffairs and International Trade Canada, 2007), document 518.
74 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 5840, file 50134-40, Arnold Smith, Cairo despatch 283, 17 May 1960.
75 Ibid., Vol. 5825, file 50131-40, Extract from minutes of tenth meeting of Commonwealth
prime ministers, 11 May 1960.
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“an underlying common interest between the UAR and the West,” that of pre-
venting Communist domination of new nations in the Middle East and Africa.
Though Smith’s arguments did not seem to have much effect on this occasion,
the interview ended with “kind and rather flattering comments by Nasser about
Canada’s goodwill.”76
Conclusion
As Smith summed it up in a memo to Diefenbaker, the year 1959 had seen
major progress in British and western relations with the UAR. Canada’s inter-
est in the situation was “political, and more as a member of ‘the West’, than
bilateral.” The immediate danger in the Middle East was “a sudden crisis which
could lead to military hostilities on some scale, small or great, with the possi-
bility of direct great power intervention.” The other — and, in the long term,
perhaps even more significant — question involved was that of the west’s rela-
tions with former colonies.77 In the Arab world and elsewhere, as Smith had
pointed out in an earlier document, there was a very strong “emotional antipa-
thy” to and suspicion of the west, arising from the past imperial activities of
Britain and France. Canada, as a former colony itself, had “a significant oppor-
tunity and hence responsibility” to act as an intermediary, soothing such fears
for the sake of the western alliance.78
In supporting British policy during 1959, therefore, Smith, Green, and
Diefenbaker — for all their emotional ties to Britain — believed that they were
promoting Canada’s national interest, which was inextricably bound up with
the success and prestige of its Cold War allies. If what the British wanted from
Canada had seemed not to be ultimately in the best interests of the west as a
whole, or if the Americans had strenuously objected, the Canadians would not
have done what they did. The Conservative government’s position was, there-
fore, surprisingly close to the much better known stance taken by Pearson and
St. Laurent in 1956. The Liberals did not necessarily look forward to a world
in which all the bonds with Britain would be broken, nor did the Conservatives
want to retain the last vestiges of colonial subordination. Instead, the two par-
ties shared a vision of Britain as one of Canada’s closest partners in world
affairs. To Liberals and Conservatives alike, the multilateral systems to which
the mother country and the former colony both belonged mattered far more than
did the bilateral relationship with Britain itself. The gradual loosening of ties
between Canada and the United Kingdom was a process full of unexpected
turns and seeming contradictions, due to the tense and complicated interna-
tional framework in which it took place. Close political cooperation between
76 Cairo to External telegram 693, 28 December 1960, DCER, Vol. 27, document 519.
77 Smith, memo for Prime Minister, 8 September 1960.
78 LAC, RG 25, Vol. 7602, file 11253-B-40, Cairo to External telegram 881, 6 October 1959.
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Canada and the UK did not end with Suez, but it was as a fellow member of the
western alliance and the Commonwealth, not as a mother country, that Britain
received Canadian support and assistance in the Middle East at the end of
empire. The story of Canada’s development “from colony to nation” is incom-
plete without this international dimension.
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